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Abstract
In this chapter, a generalization of the Ricardian model of international trading is presented.
Unlike the original Ricardian analysis, the presented model takes into account the producers
entrepreneurial activities, their specialization factor (the improvement factor in production
due to specialization) and the countries taxes (tariffs). The main result of this model is that
for a given entrepreneurial activity culture and a given specialization factor, there exists a
critical taxation level, above which specialization and all entrepreneurial activities are
suppressed and international commerce is ceased. The transition from a working interna-
tional market to a trade-less one is an abrupt one and resembles a phase transition.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, international trading, specialization, unstable markets,
entrepreneurial behavior, entrepreneur, iterative economic processes, Austrian school of
economic
1. Introduction
One of the successes of the classical economics revolution was to rebut the mercantilist tradi-
tion that holds the premises that trading can be harmful for the trading countries. The success
was not merely an academic one; as a result of this revolution, Britain, Europe and eventually
the whole world experienced a great economic boom.
The revolution was based on three important realizations:
1. The market does not prefer specialization due to the differences in the inborn merits of
humans. Specialization itself makes the market much more efficient. Even if initially
people have the same general merits, they can still specialize and optimize the market.
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
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2. The market is not a zero sum game. Both sides (countries), in any free transaction, buyers
and sellers, benefit from trading.
3. Similarly, trading improves the condition of (international) producers, regardless of the
efficiency differences between them.
Despite the fact that these realizations were initial ingredients in the classical revolution, the
classical economists themselves did not integrate them in a single theory. While Smith talked
only on the first and second realizations [1], Ricardo in the law of comparative advantage
disregards the effect of specialization and focused on the third realization [2].
It is a common mistake to assume that Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage does take
specialization into account; however, it does not. It assumes that the producer’s efficiency is
independent of his specialization level [2–6].
During the marginalist revolution [7] in the 1870s, the world of economics experienced another
split of visions: the majority of the economics community adopted the Marshallian-Walrasian
tradition [8, 9], which based their studies on equilibrium analysis. A minority of the economists’
community, which was known as the Austrian School [10–12], based their analysis on method-
ological individualism, that is, they based their approach on the acting entrepreneur [13–15].
This approach was alien to the main stream, where the Marshallian-Walrasian tradition was
rooted, especially after the work of Knight [16], which based the market on perfect knowledge.
In a perfect knowledge market, there is no room for entrepreneurial activity.
Uncertainty is the playing ground in which the entrepreneur acts. Both schools recognize the
fact that the market tend to an equilibrium state, but the realization is different. Perfect
knowledge cannot exist in a disequilibrium market. It is much more difficult to explain the
equilibria existence in the presence of perpetual entrepreneurial activities. The Austrian econ-
omists explained that the entrepreneurs are not a disruptive element, but rather a stabilizing
one, since the entrepreneur recognizes any deviation from equilibrium as an entrepreneurial
opportunity. Consequently, his entrepreneurial act stabilizes the market and helps in keeping it
at a semi-equilibrium state.
The main problem is that from the Austrian’s writing, it seems as if the entrepreneur has some
special merits [13–15], which helps him recognize the discrepancy in the market, which he can
mitigate with his entrepreneurial activity. However, since it was not clear what this merits are,
they never demonstrate it.
In [17], it was demonstrated that entrepreneurial activity can be totally random. No insight is
required for a successful entrepreneurial act. In fact, the profit and loss mechanism along with
some memory of past transaction is sufficient to navigate the entrepreneurial activity in the
right direction to mitigate the deviations from equilibrium.
International trade requires specialization, and specialization is an entrepreneurial activity.
The producer risks himself in specializing. While specializing, the producer compromises, for
he has to change his production point, at least temporarily, to a worse one. His analysis teaches
him that there is a good chance that eventually, after trading, his condition will be better;
however, by no means, it is a simple decision to specialize. It is an entrepreneurial decision.
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Taxes and regulations suppress entrepreneurial activity, but they operate in a different manner.
Regulations prohibit some activities, while taxes reduce the motivation to make them. There-
fore, trade, international and domestic, requires entrepreneurial activity and specialization,
while taxes suppress the three.
There is a delicate connection between these components. For example, when entrepreneurial
activities increase (either by educational activities or regulations’ reductions), specialization
and trading are encouraged despite the suppressive effect of some taxes.
Any theory of international trading that does not include entrepreneurial and specialization
([3]) along with taxes cannot be regarded as a complete theory. In this chapter, we propose a
model, which integrate these components into a single model, which yields simple relations.
2. The effect of taxation
When two traders interact and exchange a certain good, their status is presented initially as a
point in the commodities space. The exchange itself is presented by arrows, which oriented
toward the final states (final points in the commodities space—see Figure 1). When there are
no taxes, then the two arrows are identical in terms of length and slope.
However, when taxes are applied, then the head of the arrows is drawn toward the origin. It
does not matter whether the taxes are collected in terms of commodity A or commodity B. The
buyer ‘sees’ a higher price, while the seller ‘sees’ a lower one.
In Figure 1, the collected taxes are 20% of the exchanging commodities. In the figure, it is
assumed that both buyers and sellers pay the same tax level.
In the Marshallian-Walrasian tradition, the price of commodities is determined by the intersec-
tion of the demand and supply curves [18]. This is a stationary equilibrium scenario.
Figure 1. The ‘x’ and ‘o’ represent the two traders’ possession before the trading transaction. The arrows represent the
transaction itself. On the left, there are no taxes, and therefore the arrows are parallel, while on the right, due to taxes, the
arrows are tilted toward the origin.
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In general, the curves are unknown and can have an arbitrary shape (see, e.g. [19]); however, at
the vicinity of the intersection, they can be approximated by a linear curve, that is, the demand
curve (at the vicinity of the intersection) can be written as
D pð Þ ¼ D pd (1)
while the supply curve can be written as
S pð Þ ¼ S ps, (2)
where D, S, d and s are independent of the price p.
When taxes are applied, the price increases by a factor, which for convenience matters will be
written as an exponent, et (which is equivalent to a tax of 100t%), that is, the demand curve
decreases faster
D pð Þ ¼ D petd: (3)
Similarly, in the supply curve, the price decreases by et (again, it is assumed that the taxes are
equal for buying and selling), that is
S pð Þ ¼ S pets: (4)
The intersection occurs when
D p∗ð Þ ¼ S p∗ð Þ ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
DS
p
ffiffiffiffi
Ds
Sd
q
et þ
ffiffiffiffi
Sd
Ds
q
et
ffiffi
s
d
p
et þ
ffiffi
d
s
q
et
¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
DS
p cosh αþ t θð Þ
cosh αþ tð Þ (5)
where
ffiffiffi
D
S
q
 exp θð Þ,
ffiffi
d
s
q
 exp αð Þ, at the price level
p∗ ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
DS
ds
r
sinh θð Þ
cosh αþ tð Þ : (6)
Therefore, the market price decreases, because taxes reduce the attractiveness of the commod-
ity, while the consumer price increases to
p∗eτ ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
DS
ds
r
sinh θð Þexp tð Þ
cosh αþ tð Þ : (7)
Clearly, trading is suppressed since cosh is a convex function, the denominator of Eq. (5)
increases faster than the numerator. That is, Eq. (5) decreases when taxation increases.
However, even analyses, which consider taxation, still lack two important ingredients: special-
izations and entrepreneurship.
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Following [6, 17], assume that the production possibility frontiers (PPFs) of two producers are
a1
A1
þ
b1
B1
≤ 1 (8)
and
a2
A2
þ
b2
B2
≤ 1 (9)
respectively. That is, the maximum numbers of units of commodities A and B that the first
producer can produce are A1 and B1 , respectively, and the production of the second one is
bounded by A2 and B2, respectively, while a1 and b1 are the number of units the first producer
chooses to produce, and similarly, a2 and b2 are the number of units the second one produces.
In this case, trading occurs provided the price p  ΔA=ΔB, which is the ratio between
exchanged commodities ΔA units of A for ΔB units of B, obeys
A2
B2
< p <
A1
B1
: (10)
However, if taxes are introduced, the condition for trading is less flexible
A2
B2
< pexp tð Þ < pexp tð Þ <
A1
B1
or
A2
B2
exp tð Þ < p <
A1
B1
exp tð Þ:
(11)
Therefore, trading is possible provided the tax level is lower than
t < ln
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A1
B1
B2
A2
s !
(12)
However, this analysis ignores, again, specialization.
3. The effect of specialization
In case the producers can specialize, the PPF becomes a convex curve. Therefore, if a manufac-
ture specializes by doubling the time he invests in the production of a certain product, the
resultant production increases by a factor, which is larger than 2.
Following [6, 17], we choose the following PPF, which takes specialization into account
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aA
 α
þ b
B
 β
¼ 1 (13)
The smaller the exponents α, β the higher is the level of specialization.
Hereinafter, to simplify the analysis, we take that the specialization level in both commodities
is the same, that is, α ¼ β. Therefore, we focus on a PPF of the form
a
A
 β
þ b
B
 β
¼ 1, (14)
in which case the relation between the specialization factor F and the exponent α ¼ β is
simply [6].
F ¼ 21=β1, (15)
which means that the ratio between the production productivities in the case of full specializa-
tion (free trading) and no specialization (no trading) is F ¼ 21=β1 [6].
Since the units, by which the commodities are measured, are arbitrary, then without the loss of
generality, we can replace the parameters to the dimensionless coordinates ξ  a=A and
η  b=B. Therefore, Eq. (14) reads
ξβ þ ηβ ¼ 1: (16)
Furthermore, it is convenient to change the coordinates into radial ones, that is
ξ2 þ η2 ¼ r2, (17)
ξ ¼ r cosφ, and (18)
η ¼ r sinφ: (19)
Then, instead of the Cartesian relation η ¼ 1 ξβ 1=β, a radial one emerges
r φð Þ ¼ 1
sinβφþ cosβφ 1=β , (20)
and due to the symmetry of the problem, it is more convenient to use the deviation from the
45 angle, that is, we take the angle δ ¼ φ pi=4, in which case
r δð Þ ¼ 1
sinβ pi=4þ δð Þ þ cosβ pi=4þ δð Þ 1=β ¼
ffiffiffi
2
p
cosδþ sinδð Þβ þ cosδ sinδð Þβ
 1=β (21)
For small angles, Eq. (21) can be approximated by
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r δð Þ ffi r0 þ 1
β
2
 
r0δ
2 (22)
where
r0  r δ ¼ 0ð Þ ¼ 2
1=21=β (23)
is the distance to the origin.
Equations (21) and (22) allow one to evaluate the specialization r as a function of the entrepre-
neurial activity δ, because δ is the deviation from the (pre-trade) optimal point.
Therefore, if any single producer/entrepreneur can decide in changing his working point from
r0; δ ¼ 0ð Þ to r δð Þ;δð Þ, then the producers’ population splits into two sub-groups: one at
r δð Þ;þδð Þ and the other at r δð Þ;δð Þ.
These two populations start trading with a price, which in the ξ η space is equal to 1 (which
is B=A in the a b space). Therefore, after trading they both converge to the point
r δð Þcos δð Þ; 0ð Þ, which is more favorable point in the preference ranking of the producers (since
this point is perpendicular to the PPF) (Figure 2).
When taxes are applied, the final point (after trading, AF) is closer to the origin (0,0), that is,
rAF δð Þ < r δð Þcos δð Þ ffi r0 1þ
1β
2
 
δ2
h i
. Clearly, when the taxes are high so that rAF δð Þ ≤ r0, then
the motivation for entrepreneurship, specialization, and trading vanishes.
This event occurs when the change in the arrows slope, which is the normalized change in the
price Δp, is equal to
Figure 2. Trading in the presence of specialization and taxation. Without specialization, the production point is
ξ ¼ η ¼ 1=4 (the diamond in the left figure). The curved line is the PPF. With specialization, the producers’ production
point splits into the two ‘+’, while trading (represented by arrows) improves the status of both producers to the point
represented by ‘o’ (in the right figure). Taxation tilts the arrows to a worse position, which can even eliminate the
specialization beneficial effect (the right figure).
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Δp ¼ 2 r δð Þcos δ r0
r δð Þsin δ ffi 1 β
 
δ, (24)
However, the normalized change in the price is exactly the tax level, that is, the tax level
beyond which no trading is possible (tc) is equal to
tc ffi 1 β
 
δ: (25)
Eq. (25) is the main result of this chapter, for it integrates taxation (t) specialization (β) and
entrepreneurship (δ) in a simple relation.
Now since (Eq. (15)) β ¼ 11þlog2F , then we can formulate an expression which relates the
entrepreneurial parameter δ and the specialization factor F to the critical taxation level tc:
tc ffi δ
1þ 1=log2F
(26)
This equation can be rewritten to evaluate the critical specialization factor, which is required to
initiate trading for a given level of entrepreneurship and taxation, namely
Fc ¼ 2 δ=t1ð Þ
1
: (27)
This is the specialization factor required to overcome the suppression effect of the countries’
tariffs, the graph of which is presented in Figure 3.
Since without specialization, the production frontier is a=Fþ b=B ¼ 1=F, then δ can be easily
replaced with a corresponding variation in the real commodity units Δa and Δb, namely
δ ¼ 
ffiffiffi
8
p
F
Δa
A
¼
ffiffiffi
8
p
F
Δb
A
(28)
Figure 3. The dependence of the critical specialization factor as a function of the ratio between δ and the tax level t.
Trade and Global Market32
and therefore, the critical taxation can be written as a function of the real change in production,
caused by the entrepreneurial decision, that is,
tc ffi
ffiffiffi
8
p
F Δa=Aj j
1þ 1=log2F
¼
ffiffiffi
8
p
F Δb=Bj j
1þ 1=log2F
: (29)
4. Perpetual entrepreneurial activities
In real markets (international and domestic) where the traders are also producers, as was
explained above and in [17], the producers take much risk when they decide on the amount
of good to produce. In this case, a producer may find himself in a worse condition. Any change
in his production habits is a temporary deterioration in his preference ranking.
Clearly, the only information he has on the other producers’ preferences is the market price,
which in our units is approximately p = 1.
Let us assume that all producers are identical; therefore, they all have the same production
frontier, then the nth producers can be characterized by the Cartesian pair ξn; ηn
 
or the radial
pair δn; rnð Þ. Similarly, they all have the same preference ranking matrix R ξ; ηð Þ. This two-
parameter function (matrix in the discrete case) can be regarded as the utility function of the
state ξ; ηð Þ; however, when the parameters ξ; ηð Þ are discrete, then a ranking function is
consistent with the Austrian school as well ([6, 20]). Therefore, we prefer to use the term
‘preference ranking’ matrix instead of ‘utility’ function.
Initially therefore, the point with the highest preference ranking is ξn ¼ ηn ¼ r0=
ffiffiffi
2
p
, that is,
R 0ð Þn ¼ R r0=
ffiffiffi
2
p
; r0=
ffiffiffi
2
p 
¼ max
η<η ξn½ 
R ξ; ηð Þ, (30)
which is equivalent in radial coordinates to r ¼ r0 and δ ¼ 0 (for all n).
When trading begins, each one of the producers uses the current market price to evaluate
future profits from possible production alternatives. This is a perpetual process [21], which
consists of multiple iterations.
Let m represents the iteration number. Initially, m = 0.
In any iteration, themarket price is first determined. Let the market price of themth iteration be p mð Þ.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the state of the nth producer at the mth iteration is character-
ized by the two parameters δ mð Þn ; r
mð Þ
n
 
, and therefore their state in the (m + 1)th iteration can
be written
δ mþ1ð Þn ¼ δ mð Þn þ Δδ mð Þn (31)
r mþ1ð Þn ¼ r δ mþ1ð Þn
 
(32)
where r xð Þ is function (21), and Δδ mð Þn are random variations that are subject to the constrains
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
pi
4
≤ δ mð Þn ≤
pi
4
: (33)
These states can easily be transformed back to Cartesian coordinate by
ξ mð Þn ¼ r
mð Þ
n cos δ
mð Þ
n
h i
: (34)
η mð Þn ¼ r
mð Þ
n sin δ
mð Þ
n
h i
(35)
Now, all the possible states that are reachable by trading ξ; ηf gmust obey
η η mþ1ð Þn ≤  τp
mð Þ ξ ξ mþ1ð Þn
 
, (36)
where τ ¼ exp sgn δð Þtð Þ ¼
exp tð Þ δ > 0
exp tð Þ δ < 0
	
is the taxation effect on the price level (note that it
has the opposite effect on buyers and sellers).
If among all these points (which are reachable by trading), there is at least one point, whose
preference ranking is larger than the previous iteration ranking R ξ mð Þn ; η
mð Þ
n
 
, that is,
R ξ mð Þn ; η
mð Þ
n
 
< max
ηη
mþ1ð Þ
n ≤τp mð Þ ξξ
mþ1ð Þ
nð Þ
R ξ; ηð Þ (37)
Then, ξ mþ1ð Þn ; η
mþ1ð Þ
n
n o
(or equivalently δ mþ1ð Þn ; r
mþ1ð Þ
n
 
) is chosen as the next iteration produc-
tion point, otherwise (if the ranking is lower than the previous one) then this trial point is
rejected and the previous production point is kept.
Clearly, this process determines the production decisions, and it does not include the trading
results. In principle, nothing assures the entrepreneurial producer that he will reach a higher
ranking point. This is a risk that he takes.
5. Simulations
We simulate the market with N entrepreneurs, which their entrepreneurial activities in every itera-
tion Δδ are randomly selected with a uniform distribution, namely their probability density satisfies
P Δδ ¼ xð Þ ¼
1=Φ xj j < Φ=2
0 else
:
	
(38)
All entrepreneurs have the same PPF with a specialization exponent of β ¼ 1=2 (which is
equivalent to a specialization factor of F = 2).
We begin with zero taxes andN = 40,000 entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs can be distributed
among different countries provided there are no tariffs.
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In this case, the initial market is totally unstable, and in the very first trading iterations, the
market splits into two distinct population sub-groups: one group produces more units of
commodity B than units of commodity A (for which δ > 0) and vice versa for the second group
(for which δ < 0). The problem is totally symmetric, and there are no drifts (unlike [17], where
the drifts seem to be a simulation artefact).
In Figure 4, two histograms of the population as a function of the iterations number (the time)
are presented. As can be seen, the population indeed splits into two population sub-groups.
Therefore, half of the iterations, on average, do not improve specialization, because they work
in the wrong direction. The average improvement, among those that do contribute, is Φ=4 (the
average between zero and Φ=2); therefore, the specialization angles increase linearly with the
iteration number m:
δ mð Þ ¼ Φm=8 Φm=8 < pi=4pi=4 else
	
(39)
where m stands for the iteration number and the upper/lower signs of ‘’ stand for the buyers/
sellers population group, respectively. These equations are presented in the left plot of Figure 4
by the dashed lines for the simulation parameter Φ ¼ 0:015Rad.
Similarly, we can clearly see the ‘parabolic’ rise in the specialization factor r (the right figure).
The dashed curve corresponds to the function
r mð Þ ¼
1=
ffiffiffi
2
p
cos Φm=8ð Þ þ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffifficos Φm=4ð Þp Φm=8 < pi=4
1 else
8><
>: (40)
which is a derivation of Eq. (21) for β ¼ 1=2.
Figure 4. The population distribution as a function of the iteration number (temporal histogram). The darker the color,
the higher is the number of producers. The instability is clearly shown as the population splits into two sub-groups of
specialized producers-buyers and sellers. The dashed curves correspond to functions (39) and (40).
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When transaction taxes are applied (i.e. tariffs in international trading), then the system can be
quasi stable.
In the next simulation, the tax levels are varied. For every tax level, 500 iterations were applied
on amarket ofN = 400 participants (which can represent 400 countries). The results are presented
in Figures 5 and 6. The transition between the specialization domain (high r) and non-
specialization domain (low r) is clearly seen. Below the critical taxation level, the market experi-
ences a split, and full specialization is reached when the standard deviation of δ converges to
σ δð Þ ! pi=4, while the mean specialization parameter r converges to rh i ! 1. However, when
the taxes are higher than the critical level tc ffi Φ=4 (note that β ¼ 1=2), specialization and trading
are totally suppressed. The transition is extremely sharp and it resembles a phase transition.
When the simulation runs over many entrepreneurial parameter’s value (Φ), a phase diagram
appears (Figure 7). The gray levels represent the mean value rh i after 500 iterations. However,
Figure 5. The impact of taxation on the standard deviation of δ, left figure, and the mean value of r, right figure (both are
a measure of specialization) for the entrepreneurial parameter Φ ¼ 0:03Rad after 500 iterations and N = 400 participants
(entrepreneurs/countries/producers). The critical taxation level tc ffi 1 β
 
Φ=2 is presented by the horizontal dashed line.
Figure 6. Same as Figure 5 but for Φ ¼ 0:08Rad.
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there are no gray levels, there are only black (no specialization and no trading) and white (full
specialization and full trading). For low taxation level, the transition between the two ‘phases’
agrees with the theoretical line tc ffi 1 β
 
Φ=2.
It should be stressed that in this chapter, it was assumed that the entrepreneurial activity is
bounded by regulations. These regulations were manifested by the uniform distribution. In
case the regulations are less binding, and the entrepreneurial activity is unbounded and is
affected only by human merits, then the distribution may be replaced by a normal, that is,
Gaussian, distribution, in which case the transition between phases depends on the measure-
ment time and is clearly less sharp.
6. Summary
In this chapter, a generalization of the Ricardian model was presented. Unlike the original
model, the presented one takes into account:
1. Entrepreneurial activities. The model regards the market as a perpetual process of entre-
preneurial actions. The producers check random variations and choose the ones with the
highest prospect of being profitable.
2. Specialization. The model takes into account the fact that specialization is not a linear
process.
3. Taxes and tariffs. In the presence of taxes, the effective price that the buyer ‘sees’ is
different from the one the seller ‘sees’. This fact is also taken into account.
The main result of this model is that when the entrepreneurial activity is bounded by regula-
tions (and can be approximated by random variables with a uniform distribution), a critical
Figure 7. A two-dimensional phase diagram. The diagram represents rh i, which is a measure of market specialization, as
a function of the entrepreneurial activity parameter Φ and the taxation level t. The darker the color, the lower is the value
of rh i. The phase transition is clearly seen. The dashed line corresponds to tc ffi 1 β
 
Φ=2.
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taxation level appears, below which the market propagates toward full specialization, and the
market clears by trading, while above this level, specialization is fully suppressed and no
trading is possible. The transition between these two domains is extremely sharp and resem-
bles a phase transition.
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